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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two roommates, Geoffrey and Nicholas, rented property from their landlord, 
Theresa Smith.1 One month, their landlord noticed the water bill was higher than 
usual, and so she went to investigate the properties she owned.2 Theresa thought 
there was probably just a water leak.3 She approached the property rented by 
Geoffrey and Nicholas and used her own key to enter their residence.4 Theresa 
noticed contraband inside, so she decided to contact the authorities.5 After that, 
she allowed a law enforcement officer to enter the residence without a warrant.6 
Neither Geoffrey nor Nicholas were home during either entry to protest.7 If the 
officer viewed only what Theresa described, the search would likely be lawful 
under the private search doctrine.8 This is an example of how the private search 
doctrine works.9 Now imagine what someone could do with the password to 
another person’s computer or cell phone.10 
Under the private search doctrine, when a private party violates a person’s 
privacy by conducting a search, a government official can follow-up that search 
and conduct one of their own without a warrant, so long as the second search 
 
1. United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 499 (6th Cir. 2003). 
2. Id. at 499–500. 
3. Id. at 500. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 501, 510.  
7. Id. at 500.  
8. These facts are from United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2003). Although some 
circuits hold the private search doctrine applies to residences and some do not, see infra Part VIII, this particular 
case held the private search did not justify the warrantless entry because the officer’s search exceeded the scope 
of the landlord’s. Id. at 510. 
9. Infra Part II.  
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 
195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016) 
(law enforcement officer searched a cell phone under the private search doctrine). References to cell phones and 
modern cell phones in this Comment are references to “smart phones” specifically—smart phones are small, 
lightweight, minicomputers with many uses. What Are the Different Types of Computer?, REFERENCE.COM, 
https://www.reference.com/technology/different-types-computer-7c93526a14be5dcf (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
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does not exceed the scope of the first.11 The Supreme Court of the United States 
created the private search doctrine in 1984 in U.S. v. Jacobsen, where it held that 
because a private party frustrated the privacy interests of the defendant, the 
government actor was free to view the contents because it no longer constituted 
an unreasonable search.12 When applied to digital devices, the doctrine had been 
used broadly—allowing police to search any files on a zip drive, for example, 
simply because a private party knew what was on it.13 But in recent years, courts 
have been in disagreement about the scope of this doctrine due to the influential 
decision Riley v. California.14 
Riley explained that modern cell phones “hold for many Americans ‘the 
privacies of life.’”15 They have the capacity to store many different types of 
information, from photographs to Internet browsing history.16 They can contain 
many sensitive records and even private information that cannot be found in a 
home.17 The use of cell phones is now so pervasive that “the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”18 
This concept has led recent courts to favor the individual’s privacy interests in 
digital devices and narrow the scope of the private search doctrine when it comes 
to searching them.19 
The Sixth Circuit adopted a narrow scope of the private search doctrine in 
United States v. Lichtenberger, following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States.20 The policy under Riley v. California that cell phones 
are as private as the home under the Fourth Amendment shows that courts are not 
only correct in narrowing the doctrine, but that cell phones and similar digital 
devices should be exempt from the private search doctrine altogether.21 
This Comment first explains the private search doctrine and its origins.22 It 
then explains the two private search cases applying the doctrine to digital 
 
11. Stephen LaBrecque, “Virtual Certainty” in a Digital World: The Sixth Circuit’s Application of the 
Private Search Doctrine to Digital Storage Devices in United States v. Lichtenberger, 57 B.C. L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 177, 181 (2016). 
12. 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984). 
13. See Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012) (the mother brought a zip drive to the police, 
claiming she reviewed its contents and knew it contained child pornography).  
14. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 
(6th Cir. 2015). 
15. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
16. Id. at 2489. 
17. Id. at 2491. 
18. Id. at 2484. 
19. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–488 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting the Riley 
decision’s analysis of phones adds weight to one side of the scale when balancing individual and state interests). 
20. Id. at 488.  
21. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (comparing privacy interests in phones to a home).  
22. See infra Part II.  
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devices, Rann and Runyan.23 Then, this Comment dives into the case Riley v. 
California, and explains the ripple effect Riley created on legal treatment of 
technology.24 Next, this Comment shows the emerging circuit splits following the 
Riley decision, created by Lichtenberger and Johnson in their narrowing of the 
private search doctrine.25 This Comment shows that the emerging policy 
protecting technology from government searches is likely to influence future 
courts in continuing to narrow the doctrine.26 Finally, it argues that because of the 
high privacy interests in cellphones, as the Riley court explained, cellphones and 
similar technology should be exempt from the private search doctrine 
altogether.27 
II. THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against 
unreasonable searches of peoples’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”28 Under 
that amendment, the government may only search by first obtaining a warrant.29 
But government agents are able to avoid the warrant requirement in special cases 
through the “private search doctrine,” as created by U.S. v. Jacobsen,30 where, 
after a search by a private party, a replicated warrantless search by a government 
agent is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.31 This Part 
explains the U.S. v. Jacobsen decision, which is the basis for the private search 
doctrine.32 Then, it describes the policies underlying the doctrine.33 
In U.S. v. Jacobsen, the private freight carrier Federal Express had 
accidentally damaged a package with a forklift, and pursuant to company policy, 
employees opened the package to examine its contents.34 Upon inspection, the 
Federal Express employees observed a series of zip-lock bags containing white 
powder and contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration.35 The federal agent 
saw the same white powder in the package and opened the bags, identifying the 
substance as cocaine.36 The agents rewrapped the package and obtained a warrant 
 
23. See infra Part III.  
24. See infra Part IV.  
25. See infra Part V.  
26. See infra Part VI.  
27. See infra Part VII.  
28. U.S. CONST. amend IV.  
29. Id. 
30. 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
31. Id. at 117–19. 
32. Infra Part II. 
33. Infra Part II.  
34. 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984). 
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 111–12. 
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to search the place to which it was addressed, eventually arresting and charging 
the respondents in that case.37 The issue before the court was whether the Fourth 
Amendment required the federal agent to obtain a warrant before he opened the 
bag and tested the cocaine.38 
The Jacobsen Court held that the removal and inspection of the substance 
within the plastic bags in the damaged package infringed no legitimate 
expectation of privacy, and therefore did not constitute a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.39 
In its holding, the Court in Jacobsen reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is 
implicated only if the authorities use information that has not already frustrated 
the respondent’s expectation of privacy.40 However, the expectation of privacy in 
that case had already been frustrated by the Federal Express employees when 
they inspected the package, and so the court held the respondents had no privacy 
interest in the contents of the package once unsealed and examined by the 
employees.41 “The agent’s viewing of what a private party had freely made 
available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”42 
In assessing whether the actual testing of the cocaine was a search, the court 
reasoned that the suspicious nature of the material made it virtually certain the 
substance tested was in fact contraband.43 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the 
safeguards of a warrant could at best only minimally advance Fourth Amendment 
interests because the trace amount of material lost to the drug test has a de 
minimis impact on any property interest.44 
Since the search of a private party frustrated the expectation of privacy of the 
respondent, and the testing of the cocaine was such a minimal impact on any 
property interest, the agent’s search did not infringe on Fourth Amendment 
protections.45 
The policies underlying the private search doctrine originated both from 
Jacobsen, and from an earlier case, Burdeau v. McDowell.46 Decided in the early 
1900s, Burdeau analyzed what constitutional protections individuals are entitled 
to under the language of the Fourth Amendment.47 The United States Supreme 
 
37. Id. at 112. 
38. Id. at 111.  
39. Id. at 119. 
40. Id. at 117. 
41. Id. at 119, 121. 
42. Id. at 119.  
43. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 119, 125. 
46. 256 U.S. 465 (1921); After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016, 
11:15 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/743564/after-riley-circuits-narrow-private-search-doctrine (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
47. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921). 
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Court explained both the history and origin of the Fourth Amendment to show 
the framers created the Amendment as a restraint on sovereign authority.48 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects against government action, not 
private action, even if the private action is unlawful.49 Under this reasoning, once 
a party’s expectation of privacy is frustrated by a private search, the government 
is not barred by the Fourth Amendment from using the then non-private 
information.50 Together, Burdeau v. McDowell’s policy and the U.S. v. Jacobsen 
decision created the private search doctrine.51 
III. THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO DIGITAL DEVICES 
Within private search doctrine jurisprudence, there are two notable cases that 
applied the private search doctrine to digital devices, which provided an example 
for other courts on how the doctrine could be applied to these types of devices.52 
The first of these cases to apply the doctrine was in the Fifth Circuit,53 and the 
second was in the Seventh Circuit, which adopted the approach used by the 
Fifth.54 This Part illustrates these two cases.55 
In United States v. Runyan, the defendant’s wife turned over a complete 
collection of disks, alleging that she found child pornography on some of them.56 
The Fifth Circuit held that the police exceeded the scope of the initial search 
because they were not “substantially certain that all of the disks contained child 
pornography.”57 The Fifth Circuit created its “substantial certainty” guideline, 
analogizing electronic devices to physical containers, in hopes that police will not 
engage in “‘fishing expeditions’ by opening closed containers.”58 Notably, the 
Fifth Circuit also held that the government was able to search the contents of an 
electronic device once a private party viewed at least one file.59 The Court 
 
48. Id. at 475. 
49. Id.; see also  Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (“a wrongful search or seizure 
conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and . . . such private wrongdoing does not 
deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully”). 
50. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.  
51. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984).  
52. See infra Part III (discussing the two notable cases that applied the private search doctrine to digital 
devices).  
53. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001). 
54. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012).  
55. Infra Part III.  
56. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 453–54 (5th Cir. 2001); After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, 
supra note 46.  
57. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464. 
58. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46. 
59. Id.   
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reasoned that holding otherwise might over-deter police from thorough searches 
of containers where the owners had diminished expectations of privacy.60 
In Rann v. Atchison,61 the Seventh Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning.62 There, a daughter and her mother brought the father’s zip drive to 
the police, and claimed the drive contained child pornography.63 Because the 
mother and daughter knew what was on the device, the Court reasoned, the 
police officers were “substantially certain” the zip drive contained child 
pornography.64 The Fifth Circuit held that the search, therefore, did not exceed 
the scope of the private search, and the officers were able to search the entire zip 
drive.65 Before Riley v. California, both of these cases demonstrated how courts 
applied the private search doctrine to electronic devices.66 
IV. THE RILEY V. CALIFORNIA RIPPLE EFFECT 
The United States Supreme Court took a new turn when it announced in the 
precedential case Riley v. California that individuals have a high privacy interest 
in their cell phones.67 This Part first explains the decision,68 and then explains its 
potential legal impact.69 
A. Riley v. California 
The court in Riley v. California handled the issue of whether the digital 
information on a cell phone may be searched incident to arrest.70 There, 
petitioner David Riley was pulled over for driving without proper registration 
stickers.71 During that stop, the officer learned Riley also had a suspended 
license, and impounded the car—finding handguns under the car’s hood.72 While 
arresting Riley, the officer seized his cell phone from his pocket and discovered 
evidence associating Riley with the “Bloods” street gang.73 
 
60. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465. 
61. 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012). 
62. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.  
63. Id.   
64. Rann, 689 F.3d at 838.  
65. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46. 
66. See Rann, 689 F.3d at 838; and United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 465 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying 
the private search doctrine to an electronic device). 
67. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
68. Infra Part IV.A.  
69. Infra Part IV.B.  
70. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id.  
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In holding that the officer could not search the contents of the smart phone 
incident to arrest,74 the Riley court balanced the degree to which the search 
intrudes upon a person’s privacy against the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.75 The governmental interests 
furthered from a search incident to arrest—protecting the officer’s safety and 
preventing destruction of evidence—do not apply to the search of digital 
information on a cell phone, according to the Riley court.76 Digital data cannot be 
used by itself as a weapon to harm an officer making an arrest, and any concern 
of destruction of evidence for a digital device is not enough because it is unlikely 
to occur.77 
In weighing the privacy interests of the individual, the Riley court noted how 
smart phones are highly distinguishable from their older telephone counterparts.78 
“Modern cell phones implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by 
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”79 The devices are in fact 
minicomputers with enormous storage space capable of storing the equivalent of 
millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.80 
Therefore, the Court decided, the storage capacity of modern cell phones has 
large consequences for privacy.81 Riley then ruled that the information contained 
on a cell phone, because of these high privacy interests, could not be searched 
incident to arrest without a warrant.82 
The Riley v. California decision did not implicate the private search doctrine 
directly, rather the holding was directed only at searches incident to arrest.83 
However, the analysis in Riley has impacted courts and scholars citing the 
decision.84 
B. Phone Sweet Phone: The Impacts of Riley 
Riley v. California contained deep analysis on the individual privacy interests 
implicated by searching cellphones.85 First, the court compared cell phones to a 
home.86 The Court explained that modern phones not only contain very sensitive 
 
74. Id. at 2485. 
75. Id. at 2478. 
76. Id. at 2484–85. 
77. Id. at 2485. 
78. Id. at 2488–89. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 2489. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 2493. 
83. Id.  
84. Infra Part IV.B. 
85. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
86. Id. at 2491. 
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personal information that was previously found in the home, but also personal 
information that is never found in a home; cell phones therefore expose to the 
government even more than what can be found in an exhaustive search of a 
house.87 The Court held that not only was the officer in Riley not able search the 
phone incident to arrest, but generally that a warrant is required before a search 
of a cell phone.88 The following subpart analyzes how Riley has affected 
reasoning in other areas of law,89 and how that reasoning affects the private 
search doctrine.90 
1. The Potential Effects on a Different Doctrine: The Third-Party Doctrine 
Following Riley’s analysis on the privacy interests involved with the modern 
cell phone, many scholars have alluded to advancements in the law based on 
Riley’s analysis, such as extending protections to the third-party doctrine—where 
privacy interests in information are forfeited at the moment of conveyance to a 
third party—or even removing the third-party doctrine altogether.91 
The Riley Court explained that much of the important data viewed or used on 
cell phones is not actually stored on the device itself, which further complicates 
the privacy interests at stake.92 Instead, modern phones access data contained 
elsewhere, known as “cloud computing.”93 Scholars have explained that the 
third-party doctrine still applies to cell phones despite the Riley decision, because 
Riley did not address implications on the third-party doctrine.94 One scholar, 
Joshua Vittor, urged that Fourth Amendment protections be expanded in the face 
of rapidly expanding technology.95 For example, in United States v. Warshak, the 
Sixth Circuit limited the scope of the third-party doctrine as applied to emails 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 2493. 
89. Infra Part III.B.1. 
90. Infra Part III.B.2.  
91. The third-party doctrine holds that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in, and no Fourth 
Amendment protection of, information that is given to third parties. Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for 
Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 73, 74 (2014). See also Joshua Vittor, What 
Would a Martian Think of Cell Phones? The Third-Party Doctrine and Technological Extensions of the Human 
Self, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 255 (2016); Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a 
Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 
19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154 (2014); George M. Dery III & Kevin Meehan, A New Digital Divide? 
Considering the Implications of Riley v. California’s Warrant Mandate for Cell Phone Searches, 18 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 311 (2015). 
92. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
93. Id. Cloud computing is when data is stored and accessed over the internet, instead of being stored on a 
device’s own hard drive. Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
94. Vittor, supra note 91, at 258.  
95. Id. at 272. 
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because emails have become an essential form of communication; the Fourth 
Amendment must keep pace with ever-evolving technologies.96 This is why, 
Vittor explained, the third-party doctrine is perhaps not suitable for a growing 
digital age.97 Thus, following Riley v. California, there are potential implications 
to expand this other doctrine—the third-party doctrine.98 
2. The Reasoning for Expanding the Third-Party Doctrine After Riley, 
Applied to the Private Search Doctrine 
Since scholars like Vittor urge that the third-party doctrine is inappropriate in 
a digital age where technologies are ever changing, it is equally important to 
consider how the digital age impacts the private search doctrine.99 United States 
v. Warshak limited the third-party doctrine because emails have become essential 
communication; therefore, as people become dependent on their modern phones, 
courts could follow this same line of reasoning and limit the private search 
doctrine because phones are essential methods of communication.100 The Riley 
analysis has not only urged that police cannot search cell phones incident to 
arrest, but it has apparently shown that the high privacy expectations in modern 
phones created a new policy for technology.101 The policy is that cell phones are 
not simply physical objects, they are provided a high expectation of privacy in 
Riley because they “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”102 This is 
the theory used by scholars in advocating for a revised third-party doctrine,103 
and it applies similarly to the private search doctrine. 
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Following Riley, two recent decisions have joined together in narrowing the 
private search doctrine.104 These two new cases created a circuit split with the 
pre-Riley cases.105 One of these recent decisions, United States v. Lichtenberger, 
 
96. Id. at 265. 
97. Id. at 266. 
98. Id. 
99. See id. (mentioning that the third-party doctrine is inappropriate in a digital age). 
100. See id. at 265 (explaining the reasoning in Warshak). 
101. See id. at 258–59 (explaining how the deep concerns emphasized in Riley offered a theoretical 
solution to revise the third-party doctrine). 
102. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
103. See Vittor, supra note 91, at 258-259 (explaining how the deep concerns emphasized in Riley 
offered a theoretical solution to revise the third-party doctrine); Watzel, supra note 92, at 76 (noting how Riley 
suggested that cloud-based data may nevertheless be afforded Fourth Amendment protection).  
104. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.  
105. Compare United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2015); and United States v. 
Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222 
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cited Riley and claimed that “the nature of the searched device greatly increased 
the potential privacy interests at stake.”106 This came shortly after another post-
Riley case that applied the private search doctrine narrowly, Johnson v. United 
States.107 Both of these post-Riley decisions stress the intrusiveness of police 
searching personal electronics.108 This Part first explains what happened in these 
two cases,109 and then examines the circuit split between them and the two 
notable pre-Riley cases.110 Lastly, this Part examines whether the Sixth Circuit 
decided the Lichtenberger case properly, ultimately concluding that the Sixth 
Circuit was moving in the right direction.111 
A. The New Decisions 
In Johnson v. United States,112 the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of 
whether the warrantless search of a cell phone following a private search 
exceeded the scope of the private search doctrine.113 In that case, two defendants, 
Alan Johnson and Jennifer Sparks, unwittingly left their cell phone in a 
Walmart.114 One of the store’s employees found the phone and agreed to return it 
to the defendants.115 However, the employee decided to peek at the contents of 
the phone, and upon discovering child pornography, instead decided to turn it 
over to the police.116 Both defendants were indicted for possession and 
production of child pornography.117 
On the private search doctrine issue, the Johnson court held the police 
officer’s search of the cell phone exceeded the scope of the Walmart employee’s 
private search.118 This was because the officer viewed one video on the phone the 
employee had not previously watched, meaning the governmental search did not 
 
(2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2016); with Rann 
v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012); and United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) (the Sixth 
and 11th Circuits disagree with the Fifth and Seventh over how narrowly to apply the private search doctrine). 
106. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.  
107. United States v. Sparks (Johnson), 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 
195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 34, 196 L. Ed. 2d 46 
(2016). 
108. After Riley, Circuits Narrow Private Search Doctrine, supra note 46.  
109. Infra Part V.A. 
110. Infra Part V.B.  
111. Infra Part V.C.  
112. Johnson, 806 F.3d 1323. 
113. Id. at 1335. 
114. Id. at 1329. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1330. 
118. Id. at 1335. Even though the court still held the subsequent search warrant valid and affirmed the 
district court’s denial of the Defendants’ motion to suppress the child pornography. Id. 
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replicate the private search and went beyond the scope of the private search 
doctrine.119 In its analysis, the Johnson court noted that approving of the search 
would be inconsistent with Riley because cell phones hold “the privacies of life,” 
and the storage capacities of phones suggest that a search warrant must specify 
what part of its contents may be searched.120 Because the employee’s search did 
not expose every part of information contained in the cell phone, no exception to 
the warrant requirement could have excused the officer’s viewing of that 
particular video on the phone.121 
Just a couple months following Johnson in early 2015, the Sixth Circuit 
decided Lichtenberger.122 Lichtenberger is similar to Johnson, but the device 
searched was a laptop computer rather than a cell phone.123 In that case the court 
decided whether an officer’s search of a laptop exceeded the scope of the private 
search, where the defendant’s girlfriend had found child pornography.124 The 
police arrested the defendant for failing to register as a sex offender.125 After his 
arrest, his girlfriend Karley Holmes looked through his computer and discovered 
numerous images of child pornography.126 Holmes then contacted the police.127 
When officers arrived at the house Holmes showed them some of the images on 
the laptop.128 Holmes could not recall if these were the same images she had 
viewed previously, and the officer testified he might have had Holmes open files 
“other than those she had previously opened.”129 
The Lichtenberger court held the warrantless search of the defendant’s laptop 
exceeded the scope of the private search.130 The court emphasized the “virtual 
certainty” requirement from the Jacobsen case,131 and found the officer’s lack of 
“virtual certainty” when he viewed the images dispositive.132 The court refused to 
apply the private search doctrine where the search exceeded the scope of the 
initial private search.133 Just like in Johnson, the Lichtenberger court cited Riley 
as instructive.134 The court decided that under Riley, “the nature of the electronic 
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device greatly increases the potential privacy interests at stake, adding weight to 
one side of the scale while the other remains the same.”135 Applying this concept 
to the private search doctrine, the court noted that this “shift” of the scale 
manifested itself in the “virtual certainty” requirement from Jacobsen.136 The 
officer in that case needed to search the laptop with “virtual certainty” that his 
search would not show him any more than what Holmes had already described to 
him.137 When the officer was uncertain that Holmes had opened the same files 
from the initial search, there was plainly no virtual certainty in that case.138 
Both post-Riley cases emphasized the importance of “virtual certainty,” and 
treated each individual file on the devices as their own container, not allowing 
the government search to exceed the specific files viewed in the initial private 
search.139 The way these two cases treated files stored on an electronic device 
differed greatly from the two notable pre-Riley cases—United States v. Runyan140 
and Rann v. Atchison.141 
B. The Circuit Split with United States v. Runyan and Rann v. Atchison 
Runyan and Rann can be distinguished from the post-Riley cases in the sense 
that the objects searched were disks and a zip drive rather than a personal cellular 
phone and laptop computer.142 But all of these cases are similar because the 
government searched personal electronic files.143 
Even though Runyan and Rann applied a “substantial certainty” test, and 
Lichtenberger applied a “virtual certainty” test, there is little functional 
difference, if any, between the two.144 Runyan read Jacobsen in combination with 
other precedential cases, declaring that searching a privately-searched container 
is not necessarily problematic if the police have substantial certainty of what 
they would find.145 Lichtenberger, in interpreting Jacobsen, decided the officer 
had to be virtually certain his search would not uncover any more than the 
private party had told him.146 Jacobsen provided both of these standards, and 
 
1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009, 195 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2016), and cert. denied sub nom. 
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although these tests are worded differently, they are functionally equivalent.147 
Both the pre-Riley and post-Riley cases were applying the same test.148 
What created the different results between the pre-Riley and post-Riley cases 
was which specific container the police needed virtual certainty in.149 What is the 
right measuring unit: the file, the folder, or the physical device?150 There was one 
main shift in applying the private search doctrine—allowing police to search only 
each individual file the private party searched as opposed to the entire device.151 
The post-Riley cases have thus narrowed the scope of the private search doctrine, 
holding a warrantless search by police cannot go beyond those electronic files 
viewed by the private party during the prior search.152 In essence, the post-Riley 
cases treated each individual file on the devices as their own “container” for 
purposes of the private search doctrine.153 
C. Were Lichtenberger and Johnson Decided Properly? 
Are Lichtenberger and Johnson correct in narrowly applying the private 
search doctrine?154 One scholar, for example, believes the the heavy focus on 
individuals’ privacy was inappropriate in Lichtenberger, and that the Sixth 
Circuit improperly ignored the balanced approach of precedent in other circuits 
while citing a case unrelated to the private search doctrine.155 This subpart 
considers whether the approach taken by Lichtenberger and Johnson was an 
appropriate change to the private search doctrine, considering their large focus on 
Riley, concluding the shift was well warranted.156 
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1. Were the Post-Riley Cases Correct in Narrowing the Private Search 
Doctrine? 
One scholar who wrote on the issue, Katie Matejka, argued the Lichtenberger 
court improperly focused on protecting data privacy.157 This scholar contended 
the use of Riley in the court’s analysis was inappropriate because it is not a 
private search case.158 This subpart considers whether the case was decided 
properly.159 
Matejka argued the Lichtenberger court ignored the balanced approach of 
other circuits and ignored its own precedent.160 In 2010, before Riley was 
decided, the Sixth Circuit held that officers who looked through a photo album of 
pornographic images of children did not exceed the scope of the private search 
because they had been told of the album’s contents.161 Similarly, only a couple 
years prior, the Sixth Circuit also held that a government search of a storage 
locker containing pornographic images of children did not exceed the scope of 
the initial private search by a storage facility employee.162 Both of these pre-Riley 
private search cases can be distinguished from Lichtenberger because 
Lichtenberger was about data on a digital device while the prior cases were 
not.163 However, Matejka drew an analogy between a digital file and a physical 
one, “the rationale extending the private search doctrine . . . to digital items is 
very clear because the folder containing all of the images of child pornography 
on Lichtenberger’s laptop is comparable to the album of photos in Bowers and 
the storage unit in Richards.”164 In all of these cases, Matejka urged, the officers 
were certain the container in question contained child pornography, but could 
have also incidentally contained something other than child pornography.165 
Therefore, Matejka argued, the Lichtenberger court should not have treated the 
laptop differently, and erred when it applied the private search doctrine narrowly 
to each individual file of child pornography viewed by the private party.166 
Although it is true the Sixth Circuit applied the private search doctrine in a 
way that appeared inconsistent with its precedent, it correctly cited and applied 
Riley because Riley contains influential analysis of a new policy that the United 
States Supreme Court intended to adopt.167 Riley is not a private search case, 
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meaning it is not dispositive as to how broadly a search can occur under the 
private search doctrine.168 Regardless, Riley thoroughly explained the importance 
cellular phones hold in the lives of Americans, and emphasized this heightened 
privacy interest.169 The holding of Riley was centered not on the fact that the cell 
phone was searched incident to arrest, but on weighing the privacy interests in 
phones—they contain a broad array of sensitive records and information.170 “Our 
holding . . . is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from a search; 
it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a 
cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”171 
Therefore, the Court based the holding of Riley v. California not on the 
mechanics of a search incident to arrest, but on a broader policy—that modern 
cell phones deserve special protection because of the increasingly private nature 
of information contained within.172 Additionally, the Court in Riley specifically 
rejected the analogy between the kinds of data found on a modern cell phone and 
information contained in physical places: “[Saying this kind of data is materially 
indistinguishable from physical items] is like saying a ride on horseback is 
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting 
from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.”173 
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit’s use of Riley as instructive was not 
improper because the United States Supreme Court applied not a rigid rule about 
the search incident to arrest doctrine, but a policy about the privacy interests in 
modern cell phones.174 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger did not cite a search 
incident to arrest case on accident.175 Instead, Lichtenberger took careful note of 
the qualities in these electronic devices that implicate privacy interests,176 and 
balancing the shift in the scale of personal interests versus governmental interests 
by using its more stringent threshold.177 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger 
merely followed Riley’s example of protecting the privacy of information 
contained in a personal digital device after weighing the interests of both sides.178 
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Lichtenberger and Johnson are not coincidences; the courts intended to apply 
Riley’s policy.179 With technology continuously developing, with new phones, 
computers, and tablets being released every few months, the decision to agree 
with the Riley Court about the privacy interests that digital devices implicate is 
not only warranted, but vitally important.180 
2. Did the Post-Riley Cases Correctly Apply the Narrowed Private Search 
Doctrine? 
Another legal researcher who wrote on the private search doctrine, Stephen 
LaBrecque, argued the Lichtenberger court may have misapplied the private 
search doctrine, even though it correctly narrowed the scope of it.181 This subpart 
considers the issue of how the post-Riley cases should have applied the 
doctrine.182 
LaBrecque asserts that, although the Sixth Circuit correctly identified the 
proper scope for the private search doctrine in Lichtenberger, it failed in applying 
the test to the facts of the case.183 LaBrecque explained that the officers in 
Lichtenberger had virtual certainty they would not reveal anything else of 
significance because they were viewing multiple files displayed as thumbnail 
images.184 He urged the Lichtenberger court was mainly concerned with 
accidental discovery of medical records, bank statements, or other personal 
documents—but because the officer viewed the files as thumbnails, the officer 
could not have seen any text-based documents.185 Therefore, LaBrecque stated, 
there was no risk the officer would accidentally discover other documents.186 
When applying the private search doctrine to see if the governmental search 
exceeded the scope of the private search, courts measure how much information 
the government stands to gain, in relation to how certain the government is that it 
will find such information.187 This measure considers the circumstances 
surrounding the governmental search, and so LaBrecque properly noted that the 
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small size and nature of thumbnail images affect what information officers learn 
during a search.188 
However, the mere existence of thumbnail images should not be dispositive 
on this issue because what information they display is unknown to the officer 
before the search.189 A disorganized person can intermingle different types of 
documents together in a single folder, and thumbnails can appear larger or 
smaller, showing more or less information.190 Therefore, the mere nature of 
thumbnails is not enough to conclude that the officer in Lichtenberger had 
sufficient “virtual certainty” the laptop’s contents would not tell him any more 
than he was told by the private party.191 
In fact, the Lichtenberger court emphasized that the private party was just not 
sure if she showed the officer the same images she had seen in her original 
search.192 This significantly influenced the court to conclude that the officer had 
no virtual certainty he would not discover anything new.193 The officer may have 
seen images the private party simply did not see in the initial search.194 
Therefore, although the consideration of thumbnail images had an effect on what 
information the officer actually learned during a search, the Lichtenberger 
decision seems appropriate considering the circumstances.195 
After Johnson and Lichtenberger applied the private search doctrine 
narrowly to digital devices, they created a circuit split with the pre-Riley private 
search cases Rann and Runyan.196 Although their decisions contrasted prior cases 
that applied the private search doctrine to digital devices, the result is likely 
appropriate because the cases applied a new policy from Riley v. California 
meant to protect privacy interests in electronic devices.197 
VI. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY: PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
With the new Lichtenberger and Johnson decisions in such stark contrast to 
the pre-Riley private search cases Rann and Runyan, other circuits that have yet 
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to decide the issue will have decisions to make.198 This Part considers what 
direction future circuits will take in deciding private search cases.199 Then, this 
Part predicts that future cases will be decided in accordance with the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits and use the narrower threshold, treating each file like its own 
“container.”200 With Lichtenberger and Johnson in contrast with Runyan and 
Rann, future courts will need to decide the proper scope of the private search 
doctrine—whether they choose to apply the broader or narrower approach.201 
This Part considers which approach is likely to be applied in the future,202 and 
how that standard will likely be applied to other devices.203 
A. The Right Legal Standard for the Private Search Doctrine 
What is the right scope for the private search doctrine?204 Runyan treated 
computer disks as their own “containers,” claiming that its analysis using 
substantial certainty was the most sensible result because it discouraged police 
from conducting “fishing expeditions” while simultaneously avoiding over-
deterrence of police searches.205 Similarly, Rann treated the zip drive as its own 
“container” when searched by a private party, instead of the files within.206 Both 
of these cases held that police did not exceed the scope of the first search, when 
they treated the entire digital device as the “container.”207 In both Runyan and 
Rann, the privacy interests in all of the files were frustrated by a private party 
viewing only some of the files.208 But Runyan and Rann’s application of the 
private search doctrine analogized digital files to physical containers in an effort 
to harmonize an issue around container searches.209 “In the context of a search 
involving a number of closed containers . . . opening a container that was not 
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opened by private searchers would not necessarily be problematic if the police 
knew with substantial certainty . . . what they would find inside.”210 
However, the analogy between electronic devices and physical containers 
falls flat after the United States Supreme Court explained in Riley v. California 
that the type of data contained in cell phones and stored in physical places is, in 
fact, very different.211 The Court stated that cell phones by their very nature 
implicate privacy concerns “far beyond those implicated by the search of a 
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”212 Therefore, the pre-Riley applications of 
the private search doctrine to digital devices were based on an analogy that was, 
in essence, disapproved of by the Supreme Court.213 
The more narrow approach to the doctrine applied by Lichtenberger and 
Johnson treats each individual file as a “container,” as opposed to the entire 
device.214 This means when a private party views only some of the files, it does 
not frustrate the expectation of privacy in the other, non-viewed files.215 
Because the United States Supreme Court has held that individuals have a 
heightened expectation of privacy for data stored on cell phones as compared to 
physical containers, the way Runyan and Rann applied the private search doctrine 
to digital devices is now outdated.216 Therefore, in applying the private search 
doctrine, future courts are more likely to treat each digital file as its own 
container when searched by the government.217 
B. How the New Standard Applies to Other Containers 
Courts can apply the doctrine’s narrower approach to digital devices other 
than cell phones so long as a court can draw an analogy from modern cell phones 
(in Riley’s analysis) to other personal digital devices, like the laptop in 
Lichtenberger.218 The Sixth Circuit in Lichtenberger had no problem relating 
Riley’s analysis to laptop computers, because it was the qualities of cell phones 
that were of particular importance to the United States Supreme Court when it 
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decided Riley.219 The Sixth Circuit used the reasoning behind the Riley Court’s 
decision, noting that cell phones are in fact just “minicomputers that also happen 
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”220 This fact, combined with the 
idea that cell phones have immense storage capacity capable of keeping data over 
long periods of time, is what the Lichtenberger court found particularly 
instructive.221 Thus, the application of a narrower private search doctrine to 
personal digital devices other than cell phones seems appropriate if the devices 
have these qualities.222 
Following that reasoning, courts could likely apply the private search 
doctrine to tablets and desktop computers.223 These two types of computers are 
very similar to both cell phones and laptops because they are computers with 
immense storage capacity.224 But it is questionable whether courts could similarly 
apply the doctrine to netbooks225 or smart watches.226 Netbooks have 
considerably less storage capacity,227 which was important to the Riley court in 
distinguishing cell phones.228 Smart watches are somewhat similar to modern 
phones because they run applications and show media.229 However, they are not 
stand-alone devices like a computer.230 They are instead designed to link with a 
modern phone, and without such a link, their capabilities are very limited.231 
Thus, for smart watches that have little storage capacity, and are used mainly as 
an easier way to receive information from a person’s phone, there are not many 
privacy interests at stake.232 
Therefore, because the broader private search doctrine standards for digital 
devices are outdated, and because future courts will likely be able to relate other 
personal digital devices to Riley’s analysis, future courts will probably apply the 
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narrower private search doctrine to searches of both cell phones and similar 
devices like desktop computers, laptops, and tablets.233 
VII. ADVOCATING A NEW EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVATE SEARCH DOCTRINE—A 
CELL PHONE IS AS PRIVATE AS THE HOME 
Cell phones are a growing necessity in the lives of every day Americans—so 
much that they appear as part of human anatomy.234 The rationale underlying 
Riley—especially the comparison between phones and the privacy interests in 
homes—brings up a new question: are phones as private as the home?235 And if 
so, should the private search doctrine be used to search them?236 This Part 
considers first how the private search doctrine affects government searches of 
homes,237 and then compares the application of the private search doctrine to 
phones.238 This Part argues cell phones, and similar electronic devices, should be 
exempt from the private search doctrine altogether.239 
A. The Doctrine’s Application to the Home 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the private 
search doctrine allows a warrantless search of a home, and circuits are divided on 
the issue.240 However, the private search doctrine has long-standing roots in the 
Court’s authority.241 This fact has been troubling to courts considering the issue, 
despite the doctrine’s solid foundation in the Fourth Amendment, since the 
warrant requirement applies only to government actors.242 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the issue most recently, 
claiming serious reservations about allowing the private search doctrine to apply 
to the search of a home.243 In holding that the doctrine could not be used for a 
warrantless search of a home, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited its State 
Constitution and the general notion that the “chief evil” the Fourth Amendment 
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sought to protect against was physical entry of the home.244 That court reasoned 
that the interests a person has in their home are entitled to the utmost respect 
from unreasonable searches.245 The court noted how careful scrutiny always 
follows the search of a private and intimate residence, because courts have 
recognized homes as unique for centuries.246 “When it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, the home is first among equals,” and stands “at the Amendment’s 
very core.”247 
Regardless, not all courts have followed this same line of reasoning.248 There 
are multiple cases that have once held that a warrantless search of a home, 
following a private search, was justifiable under a private search theory.249 In 
United States v. Jones, for example, the Fifth Circuit quickly concluded the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply.250 Citing Runyan, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that as long as the “police view” is within the scope of the initial 
private search, Fourth Amendment protections are not implicated.251 
But there are still many courts that have refused to extend the private search 
doctrine to residences, and for good reason.252 United States v. Allen, for 
example, distinguishes Jacobsen.253 The package in Jacobsen contained only 
contraband, the court explained.254 But the defendant’s motel was his temporary 
abode, containing intimate and personal items.255 The defendant Allen had a 
significant privacy interest in where he was living, when the private search did 
not completely frustrate that interest because the motel manager viewed only 
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some of his possessions.256 Therefore, although many courts have upheld 
searches of residences based on a private search theory, there remains good 
reason to doubt that the Supreme Court of the United States will allow police to 
make a warrantless entry of a premises simply because it was previously viewed 
by a private party.257 
B. Applying the Doctrine to Electronic Devices: Riley’s Policy Rationale 
Despite courts’ disagreement on whether the private search doctrine extends 
to homes because of the large privacy interests involved, Riley’s analysis 
provides huge implications to the effect of the doctrine on phones and similar 
devices.258 As Riley stated, phones often contain far more information than what 
can be found in a house.259 This means that, given the growing importance and 
widespread dependence on cell phones, warrantless searches that implicate the 
privacy interests in these devices should be taken seriously.260 
There is little question that courts afford the greatest protection to the home 
under the Fourth Amendment, but this protection can arguably be extended to 
modern cell phones, considering their unique qualities.261 A cell phone search 
shows to the government “far more [information] than the most exhaustive 
search of a house.”262 This fact alone creates huge implications for the future of 
privacy in cell phones—if a cell phone can contain documents more personal and 
private than what is stored away in a person’s home, yet the home is the most 
protected place under the Fourth Amendment, then courts should afford similar 
protections to the data stored on cell phones.263 
Compared to the papers and effects inside a residence, Riley explained that 
phones contain vast amounts of information that are far more private in nature.264 
For example, modern cell phones store enormous amounts of location data: the 
phone’s location where each call was made and received, the location of every 
Wi-Fi network joined, and even photos taken with the camera contain “geo-
tag[s].”265 Applications intended for chatting with friends, even when supposedly 
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secure, store records on the phone.266 People can always retrieve messages, with 
their respective time stamps.267 Someone searching for data can restore full 
browsing history even when the phone’s owner deletes it.268 Certain applications 
that use images, like Snapchat, store images on the phone even when the user 
does not intentionally save them via screen shot.269 
It is important to consider the large amount of the data stored on a modern 
phone, in addition to people are using them more often—becoming increasingly 
dependent on their functionalities.270 For heavy users, the amount of data stored 
on these devices is staggering.271 Because of this, it is understandable why the 
Riley court stated that modern phones contain more private information than a 
home.272 
As technology advances and as people become increasingly dependent on 
their cellular phones, it will also become increasingly important to protect the 
data they will contain.273 Therefore, this Comment urges that, based on Riley’s 
analysis and on the continuing dependence on cell phones, they should be exempt 
from the private search doctrine in the same way they were exempt from the 
search incident to arrest exception.274 
C. Applying the Legal Standard 
A private search of a cell phone will rarely provide the “virtual certainty” 
required for all of the data an officer may view during a search.275 As the 
Lichtenberger court explained its application of the doctrine, “[to stay within the 
scope of the private search, the officer] had to proceed with ‘virtual certainty’ 
that the ‘inspection of the laptop and its contents would not tell him anything 
more than he had already been told by [the private party].’”276 But with the vast 
amount of data contained in a cellular phone, it is a heavy task for an officer not 
to learn anything more while navigating the device.277 
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For example, if a police officer wishes to view an incriminating text message 
that was previously viewed by a private party, the officer would need to open the 
messages application.278 But upon opening the application, they would be 
confronted with different “threads” of conversations, showing the most recent 
message in each thread.279 Therefore, an officer would inevitably see portions of 
multiple conversations, while trying to find the one incriminating text.280 This 
demonstrates that the nature of the display of information makes it very difficult, 
if not almost impossible, for an officer to search through the contents of a 
modern cell phone without learning anything more than the private party had 
learned during the initial search.281 Or, at the very least, it would be very difficult 
to tell if the officer viewed only what the private party viewed.282 
With the risks of discovering new information so high, combined with the 
fact that phones store a plethora of data just as private as information contained 
in the home, this Comment urges that the scale weigh in favor of the 
individual.283 The risks of infringing on such privacy interests are too great, and 
so the private search doctrine should not apply to modern cellular phones.284 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
After Riley v. California, the nature of electronic devices greatly increases 
the privacy interests at stake when the government searches them, “adding 
weight to one side of the scale when the other remains the same.”285 When a 
police officer searches a digital device, like the laptop in Lichtenberger, the 
heightened privacy interests instruct the use of a narrower standard—treating 
each digital file as its own container.286 And when applying the private search 
doctrine’s “virtual certainty” standard, it is unlikely a police officer could search 
a device like a modern phone without learning more information, risking the 
privacy interests at stake.287 
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Given the ever-growing dependence on technology, future courts are likely 
going to use the narrower standard.288 And in the interests of each individual 
citizen, and the millions of phones and laptops involved, the private search 
doctrine should not apply to them because the risks of infringing on privacy 
interests are too great.289 
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